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AMERICA’S RAILROAD DEPRECIATION
DEBATE, 1907 TO 1913: A STUDY OF
DIVERGENCE IN EARLY 20th CENTURY
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
Abstract: In June 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
released new reporting rules that would require railroads to change
from betterment to depreciation accounting for equipment. The new
rules set off a firestorm of protest because the railroads felt they were
already recognizing physical depreciation through the current system.
The ICC, however, was looking at the concept of economic depreciation to match the cost of equipment with revenue over the life of the
asset in much the same way that industry was beginning to account
for its fixed assets. Such economic depreciation, it was felt, would
give the rate-setting ICC more stable reported incomes to determine
return on assets and the investing public a better feel for the results of
railroad operations. The debate began in a cordial fashion but deteriorated into bitter name-calling, civil disobedience, and litigation that
challenged both the accounting rules and the authority of the ICC to
issue and require them. The ICC partially won the debate, yet railroads were able to keep betterment accounting for track structures
another 70 years before the full convergence of industry and railroad
accounting standards occurred.

INTRODUCTION
After nearly 20 years of ineffective railroad regulation by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the U.S. Congress
in 1906 passed the Hepburn Amendment to clarify several Supreme Court decisions and to force the railroad industry to publish its rate schedules. The new act also gave the ICC legal authority to set “fair and reasonable” rail tariffs and rates. The law
authorized the ICC to develop uniform accounting procedures
for railroads to meet this new mandate. The ICC quickly issued
new accounting and financial reporting rules for all railroads
that came under its jurisdiction. Though the rules were similar
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the former editor Stephen Walker,
two anonymous reviewers, the current editor Richard Fleischman, and Melinda
Hyche for her meticulous editing of the final draft.
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to the ones issued in 1894 and largely ignored by the industry,
the railroads were now required to recognize a depreciation expense and a corresponding reserve for their “non-permanent”
fixed assets – rail equipment. Protests quickly erupted over the
new rules and a fiery debate ensued between the railroad’s traditional concept of “physical depreciation” and the ICC’s application of a new theory called “economic depreciation.” Though
the debate solidified the ICC’s authority to issue and require specific accounting rules, it eventually compromised and allowed
betterment accounting for track and way structures, a compromise that would result in divergent accounting standards between railroads and industry for the next 70 years.
This paper tracks the debate over these depreciation issues
from their inception in 1907 to the final disposition by the Supreme Court in 1913. The debate is well documented through
the records of the ICC and related articles published in the national press like the Wall Street Journal (the Journal), the New
York Times (the Times), and the railroad industry’s own publication, the Railway Age Gazette (the Gazette). Prominent public accountants also weighed into the debate on both sides of
the issue, indicating an unsettled debate within the profession
over the course of the modernization of accounting principles
in the U.S. in the early 20th century. Though each source has
its own biases, taken together, they give a sense of the passion
on both sides of America’s great railroad depreciation debate.
BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE
In 1902, the newly constituted U.S. Steel Company developed innovative financial reporting procedures that included recognition of depreciation charges on fixed assets. Though
the concept of physical depreciation of fixed assets had been
recognized for nearly three quarters of a century, according to
Younkins and Flesher [1984, p. 257], the U.S. Steel disclosures
were unique among contemporary firms because they reported
depreciation as a separate expense on the income statement.
Such an innovation helped to institutionalize the concept of
economic depreciation and paved the way for the modern accrual accounting standards currently in use a century later. Because of its mission to control rail rates through the analysis of
accounting and other operational data, such an innovation in

First published in 1856, the Railroad Gazette absorbed a smaller competitor called the Railway Age and changed its name to Railway Age in January 1908,
with a further name change in July 1908 to the Railway Age Gazette.
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 ccounting could hardly have missed the attention of the couna
try’s primary railroad regulatory agency, the ICC, and its longtime chief statistician, Professor Henry Carter Adams.
The Desire for a Uniform Railroad Accounting Policy: Since the
inception of the ICC in 1887, Henry Adams had attempted to
standardize railroad reporting in the U.S., using Section 20 of
the Interstate Commerce Act as his authority. The section read,
in part, “the Commission may . . . the purposes of the act, prescribe a period of time within which all common carriers subject to the provisions of this Act shall have, a uniform system
of accounts and the manner in which such accounts should be
kept.”
His first attempt to create uniform accounting rules was in
1894, when the ICC issued Classifications of Operating Expenses to guide railroads in their data-reporting requirements. The
requirements included modern double-entry accounting practices; however, its modified accrual nature left a limited articulation between the balance sheet and income statement (actually
a profit and loss account). Though the American Association of
Railroad Accounting Officers (AARAO) was instrumental in developing the pamphlet, the reporting requirements went largely
ignored by other regulators and the industry. First, the ICC-instituted National Association of Railroad Commissioners (NARC)
balked at their usage because state commissioners felt that the
new accounting rules would hinder their ability to control rail
rates within their respective jurisdictions. This process led to
multiple and conflicting accounting procedures across state jurisdictions that caused confusion among the railroads, leading
them to resist the new national standards. Finally, legal rulings
and legislative inaction stymied Adams’ goal of a uniform accounting system for all railroads. Though Adams and the ICC
knew that the nation’s railroad reporting practices needed modernization, they could take no action until Congress gave the
ICC further authority.
In the meantime, Adams continued to issue minor revisions and clarifications to the ill-fated Classifications of Operating Expenses to make the reporting process more understandable. The nature of the accounting, however, changed very little

For a review of the development of ICC reporting requirements before 1900,
see Heier [1994, pp. 101-110].
3
Act to Regulate Interstate Commerce, February 4, 1887, amended June 29,
1906, 34 Stat. 584.
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from the 1894 document. The NARC [1905, p. 30] augured a
change when discussing the ICC’s clarification in the definition
of additions, betterments, and improvements for the AARAO.
The clarification read: “Operating Expenses should include all
expenditures necessary to keep up the general standard of efficiency.” The meaning was clear; the expenses currently reported by the railroads regarding fixed asset usage were not sufficient to give a clear picture of rail operations. The railroads,
however, were probably not too concerned with such a course
change because the ICC’s position (both politically and legally)
had not changed, at least not yet.
The Hepburn Amendment: On June 6, 1906, Congress finally acted and passed the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. The new act also gave the ICC the legal authority
to set fair and reasonable rail tariffs. To meet this new mandate, regulators were authorized to “develop uniform accounting rules, and to prescribe the forms of all accounts, records
and memoranda to be kept by carriers” [ICC, 1907b, p.139]. The
law now empowered the ICC to have rate setting as its primary mission. A uniform accounting system for railroads became
Adams’ focus. As one would imagine, the railroad industry was
not elated over the new legislation as evidenced by an editorial published in the Gazette [January 11, 1907, p. 32]. In a muted and measured tone, the industry expressed the opinion that,
“The new rate law gives the Interstate Commerce Commission
the fullest authority over railroad statistics and accounts, with
the power, not only to prescribe what accounts shall be kept,
but to forbid keeping an unapproved statistic.”
The rail industry had resigned itself to the fact that the ICC
had substantially more power, but it also suggested in the article that slow and deliberate change in reporting requirements
would better serve the traveling public and shippers. Though
protests would soon erupt over required depreciation charges, the rail industry at this point was more concerned with the
ICC’s potential inclusion of “out-side” or non-rail income as part
of tariff rate calculations. Such an inclusion would disrupt the
sensitive rate-of-return formulas that the ICC would be using to
set passenger and freight rates. Regardless of what the changes were going to be, it was clear that the industry was going
to face new accounting rules soon.
During the transition from the amendment’s ratification
and the issuance of new uniform accounting standards, the ICC
again enlisted the help of the AARAO. Professor Adams acted
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/15
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as the ICC’s liaison to a newly created Committee of TwentyFive. The ICC’s annual report [1907b, p. 40] indicated: “Conferences [with the AARAO] developed interesting and instructive differences of opinion on many accounting questions. But
it may be said that, with a few exceptions, the results arrived
at were in harmony with a consensus of opinion of a majority of its members.” The annual report did not disclose the nature of the discussions, but changes in accounting procedures
at the large manufacturers, like U.S. Steel, must have been on
the minds of the conferees. Depreciation could well have been
at the top of this list in light of comments from Price Waterhouse’s George O. May [1962, p. 190] who indicated in his memoirs that “in 1906 the straight-line amortization concept of depreciation was in fairly general use in the industrial field.”
The ICC planned to issue new financial reporting rules
for all railroads that came under its jurisdiction by June 1907.
Though the prospective rules were very similar to the ones issued in 1894, the new system would include more accruals that
would increase balance sheet and income statement articulation
similar to modern financial statements. To foster the moderni
zation of railroad reporting, the ICC also focused on the fixed
asset and capital accounts. Like U.S. Steel, the railroads would
probably now, in all likelihood, be required to recognize depreciation expense instead of their traditional manner of accounting for fixed assets called betterment accounting. Succinctly put,
depreciation represented the systematic expensing of fixed asset costs in contrast to the periodic (or irregular) recognition
of expense under betterment accounting.
A Short Explanation of Betterment Accounting: An early discussion of fixed asset accounting and profitability for railroads
came in the 1870s from Albert Fink, the superintendent of the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad. Fink suggested in an addendum to the 1875 L&N annual report [Fink, 1875, pp. 6-7] that
renewal accounts that compared actual repair costs with estimated repair costs to determine annual “due to that year’s
operations” … [and] … “To make the annual reports of a railroad
company of value, the accounts of the company should be so
kept as to show the expenses.” Fink’s methodology would be refined and institutionalized over the next thirty years, and came
to be known simply as “betterment accounting.” The name of
the methodology would evolve into the more theoretically descriptive retirement-replacement-betterment (RRB) accounting,
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) [1983,
Published by eGrove, 2006
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Para. 5], at the time of RRB discontinuance in 1983, defined
this practice as follows:
Under RRB, the initial costs of installing track are capitalized, not depreciated, and remain capitalized until
the track is retired. The costs of replacing track are expensed unless a betterment (for example, replacing a
110-lb. rail with a 132-lb. rail) occurs. In that case, the
amount by which the cost of the new part exceeds the
current cost of the part replaced is considered a betterment and is capitalized but not depreciated, and the
current cost of the part replaced is expensed. Railroads
generally have used RRB for financial reporting.
Unlike the use of modern depreciation accounting, which
actually matched fixed asset cost to revenues over a given period, the railroad under betterment accounting did not recoup
the cost of the track until replaced. It could happen in some
years that no charges to current operating expenses from track
usage were matched against revenue if no track was replaced.
By 1907, the methodology described above had been in
widespread use and acted as the basis for reporting the account
balances of the railroad’s two primary fixed asset accounts,
equipment and track structures. As the depreciation debate developed, the ICC would take the position that betterment accounting did not reflect the true cost of a railroad’s operations
because in lean years it would simply not do any replacements
or upgrades, a major safety concern for the ICC. The ICC hoped
that the upcoming depreciation requirements would provide a
more “accurate” rendering of these fixed asset balances through
a more systematic matching of fixed expenses with revenue. As
the ICC moved towards the rate-of-return basis for evaluating
rail rates, it would become clear to the rail industry that depreciation was at the heart of the evolution of the concept of
“reasonable rates” and “reasonable returns” as articulated by
the 1898 Smyth vs. Ames [169 U.S. 466] decision.
Exhibit 1 below shows a hypothetical comparison of rail returns due to the impact of the new 1907 depreciation charges
on a railroad’s financial results compared with betterment accounting. With betterment accounting intact, the pre-1907 income levels per train mile were lower due to an artificially high
expense ratio. This helped the railroads to either maintain a
lower return ratio and, consequently, higher tariff rates or justify their request for an increase. It was also possible for the
railroads to schedule betterment expenditures to plan or smooth

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/15
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annual income levels. This expense timing was the central problem voiced by the ICC in its 1905 annual report. On the other
hand, with the partial accounting for depreciation charges on
equipment, the financial position of the railroad may be improved, leading regulators to construe the higher income levels
as unreasonable. The railroad could then expect a revision of the
rail rates downward to compensate for the “excess income.”
EXHIBIT 1
Estimated Change in Railroad Financial Accounting
Results

Rail Structure Costs
Depreciable Equipment Costs
Total Assets
Revenues
Operating Expenses
Rail Structure Betterments
Equipment Betterments
Depreciation Assume 7.00% X $500,000
Total Expenses
Net Income

Accounting
before 1907
$2,500,000
$2,500,000
$3,000,000
$1,000,000
$2,400,000
$2,200,000
$2,150,000

Accounting
After 1907
$2,500,000
$2,500,000
$3,000,000
$1,000,000
$2,400,000
$2,200,000

$2,750,000

$2,235,000
$2,635,000

$2,250,000

$2,365,000

Train‑Miles

10,000,000

Revenue Per Mile
Costs Per Mile
Income per mile
Return on Assets = Income ÷ Assets

$1210.1000
$1210.0750
$1210.0250
8.33%

$1210.1000
$1210.0635
$1210.0365
12.16%

THE ICC ISSUES NEW REPORTING RULES
The Preliminary Debate over the New Depreciation Rules: With
little fanfare and with even less guidance, the ICC [1907a], on
June 3, 1907, released new accounting rules as an update to
the ICC’s original document, Classifications of Operating Expenses. The first look at the new rules had actually occurred
in April 1907 when the ICC issued Circular No. 5 to detail the

For the effects of the ICC accounting changes on income smoothing, see Sivakumar and Waymire [2003].

The newly required equipment depreciation was highlighted essentially
through the reorganization and renumbering of an official account classification
scheme.
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proposed accounting changes and to give the industry due proc
ess to comment on them before final publication. The Journal
[May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported that a large number of railroads
had indeed commented on the new rules, especially with regard
to depreciation accounting. The written replies to the circular
expressed a wide range of views on the formal depreciation account. According to the article, comments regarding Circular
No. 5 framed the coming issue by saying, “it may be said that
current practice [betterment accounting] allows for depreciation
by including renewals or replacements in operating expense and
consequently railways do not need a formal depreciation account.” The article continued by making the editorial comment
that, “It is at least our opinion [that the ICC] question whether or not this is an appropriate method of procedure.” It was
reported that the railroads felt that “there seems to be no disagreement on the proposition that operating expense should be
charged with the full amount of wear incident to the use of the
property, and that any excess over that amount should be separately charged to income.” These types of comments again signaled the railroad’s coming stance that depreciation was physical in nature and not economic, and reinforced the railroads’
fear that any depreciation account would degrade the balance
of the asset accounts and upset the delicate balance of the return-on-asset ratios.
Even with the preliminary ICC circulars issued in April and
May, it still appears that the railroads may have been caught
off-guard by some of the new depreciation rules, as evidenced
by the silence in the Gazette before June on the process leading up to the promulgation of the new accounting rules. In
fact, an early article in the Gazette [April 19, 1907, p. 507] contained no discussion of depreciation but instead stressed an upcoming rule that would make the railroad’s head accountant a
sworn agent of the government and the issue of non-rail related income being used in the rate-of-return formulas. In an article published after the issuance of the rules, the Gazette [June
21, 1907, pp. 883-884] indicated that the present rules only applied to equipment but that there was a possibility of the application of depreciation rules to track and structures. The article
further explained that such a move would make the accounting for track additions or repairs less flexible than the current

It appears that companion circulars were also issued during 1907 for the
more contentious issue of classification of “additions and betterments” related to
those costs of upgrading permanent fixed assets such as structures and rail beds.
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American system that allowed for management decisions related to the recognition of no capital costs in bad years, a safety
concern to be sure.
According to Barret [1907, p. 486], a competing publication, Railroad World, did express tacit support for the new accounting rules when it wrote, “Hitherto this question has been
thrust aside with scanty apology that due attention to repairs,
renewals and replacements excuses the omission. At its worst,
the omission to make allowance for depreciation leads to unearned payments to capital, to eventual overcapitalization, and
finally to bankruptcy.” Railroad World then expressed concern
that any rate-of-return calculations from the ICC must take into
account depreciation charges or there would be a reduction in
asset values. Although this industry publication was moderately positive about the change to depreciation, it seemed to suggest that the ICC had ulterior safety motives for the change.
Even before the official release of the new accounting rules,
Adams and members of the ICC readied the markets, the public, and especially the railroads for the announcement. For example, the Journal [May 21, 1907, p. 3] reported on the prospective accounting changes, indicating that they “were to be set
up providing for the replacement of property – annual percentages to be left to the carriers.” The same article reported that
the ICC’s aim for the new system of accounts was to “simplify the now complex problem of determining what a railroad is
earning.” Adams was quoted in an interview as saying, “it was
the intention of the commission to draw a clear line between
charges [that] merely made good the actual wear and due tear
or represented depreciations and such as represented by betterments and additions whether the latter is chargeable directly to
income or to capital.” Here the argument went beyond the recognition of depreciation, and moved towards a more modern
differentiation between capital improvements that would be depreciated and operating expenses that would have a direct effect on the earnings of a railroad.
Adams went on to indicate that in the present railroad accounting system, the definitions of such items as repairs, betterments, and additions did not convey a definite meaning,
“hence the necessity of establishing principles of accounting as
will enable the commission to determine whether operating expenses as charged on the company’s books properly represent
the cost of transportation.” In the eyes of the ICC, the railroads
were now charging only “capital improvements” against current
income, which masked the true earnings of the corporation
Published by eGrove, 2006
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 ecause under betterment accounting there was never a recovb
ery of the original cost of the railroad’s equipment through the
income statement until replacement. Adams further explained
the depreciation provision would better allow for the replacement of property before wear and tear finally forces the issue.
Unfortunately, at this point in the interview Adams made a modern theoretical mistake by saying: “Provisions should be made
out of earnings of property during the period of its use to replace it.…The purpose of depreciation is to provide a replacement fund.”
Though it was clear that Adams was moving toward the application of economic depreciation and away from accounting
for the physical depreciation of the railroad equipment, he did
seem to harbor the perspective that depreciation, though noncash in nature, would provide a direct funding source for the
replacement of equipment. Such an idea may have come from
contemporary manufacturers like U.S. Steel, which reported
equipment depreciation with extinguishments of debt. For example, in the 1904 U.S. Steel annual report [p. 11], the company stated: “The appropriation of these funds has been made
with the idea that, thus aided, the Bond Sinking Funds will liquidate the capital investment in the properties at the expiration
of their life.” In addition, the report also mentioned: “These
funds are used to improve, modernize, and strengthen properties.” In the short term, Adams’ early misunderstanding of the
cash nature of depreciation would cause some confusion in the
application of the new rules and overshadow the ICC’s purpose
better to match railroad expenditures with revenue. Finally, the
article also reported that the railroads did not object to the idea
of taking expenditures in excess of wear and tear out of earnings, but they were leery that investors would construe a formal depreciation fund as cash available for dividends.
The rationale for the new ICC accounting rules may have
gone beyond a more uniform accounting system and may have
focused on two other motivations. The first of these may have
been to foster safer railroad operations by actually forcing the
continued replacement of railroad equipment on a scheduled
basis through a change in accounting procedures. A more pernicious consideration may have been the ICC’s desire eventually
to standardize rail tariffs through railroad valuation. This possibility was made evident in a Journal article [May 23, 1907, p.1]
that reported a speech by ICC Commissioner, Charles A. Pouty,
before the National Association of Manufacturers in which he
discussed the ICC’s reasons for changing the regulatory rules.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol33/iss1/15
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First, Pouty indicated that government itself was on trial,
and that regulation must be “sufficiently strong to choke the cry
for national operation.” The concept of federal ownership and
operation of the railroads had become popular as anti-capitalist
views began to spread in the U.S. in the early part of the 19th
century. Though he did not like the idea of government control and felt the private sector the better place to control rail
operations, he did feel that a cabinet-level department of railroads should be set up to oversee rail operations and set national transportation policy. Pouty also explained that the government, and not private individuals, should have over-sight
responsibility in rate setting. This appears to have been a criticism of the federal courts and their intervention in ICC decisions on behalf of private litigants. Most importantly for this
story, Pouty indicated that, “it is probable that the interstate railways should be valued by the national government.” Pouty, the
ICC, and the rail industry knew that valuation needed proper
(and uniform) accounting data. The news report quoted Pouty
as saying: “The popular impression that if the value of our railroads were known it would be easy to adjust rates that a fair
return upon that value and only a fair return would be obtained
is entirely erroneous. The cost of reproduction is but a single factor which enters just value.” Although Pouty never mentioned the subject of the new depreciation rules, he did focus
on a set of criticisms regarding the methods railroads used to
determine and account for the value of their long-term capital.
According to Pouty, railroads could easily hide investments in
the form of stocks and bonds in related and sometimes competing railroads.
In a related Journal article [May 22, 1907, p. 5], Adams
echoed Pouty’s comments when he said: “The valuation of railroads on a scientific basis is quite feasible, but the reasonableness of railroad rates is and must be a matter of human judgment exercised beyond the bounds of mere valuation.” Adams
went on to explain that the individual subjects of railroad capitalization, valuation, and rates are related by giving a convoluted example where income should not be above the amount
needed to maintain operations if it is to be deemed reasonable

It would be nearly 60 years later when the Department of Transportation
was established by an act of Congress on October 15, 1966, with its first official
day of operations on April 1, 1967.

This was a direct reference to the stock manipulation case where E.H. Harriman of the Union Pacific and Rock Island Railroads secretly bought a directly
competing line called the Alton Railroad.

Published by eGrove, 2006

11

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 15
100

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2006

income by the Commission. In a more modern sense, he then
differentiated between the valuation used to set rates and that
of the market valuation of the railroad securities themselves.
Market valuation he felt did not equate to regulatory valuation
when it came to setting freight and passenger rates.
The popular view in this era was that high railroad market valuations were the result of high and unfair rail tariffs.
Through his example, it appears that Adams saw this controversy differently. He felt that the high market valuations and
high rates were only tangentially related by the fact that the
most profitable railroads also seemed to have the highest market value. In the end, Adams and the ICC would continue to
focus on the return on assets to determine the reasonableness
of tariffs in keeping with legal rulings. Finally, like Pouty, Adams was laying the groundwork for acceptance of the upcoming accounting rule changes. It was clear that physical valuation of the railroads was on the ICC’s agenda, and that the ICC
was going to gather the necessary data on the railroad’s capital
assets needed to complete this task. When asked about progress towards completing the new accounting system, Adams
said: “They have progressed much further than I thought they
would by this time. Operating revenues and operating expense
accounts are practically done and the accountants are pulling
together and mean business.”
After the official release of the new rules the next week,
an article published in the Journal [June 7, 1907, p. 6] highlighted the major accounting changes promulgated by the ICC.
In general, the required revenue and expense items mirrored
those of the 1894 requirements; however, the railroads were
now supposed to report those financial results monthly to the
ICC, presumably so that the ICC could maintain control over
both short-term and long-term tariffs. According to the article,
the major change in accounting regulations for 1907 included
the requirement for a formal provision of depreciation charges
and reserves for all companies covered by the Interstate Commerce Act. This depreciation requirement also differentiated operating expenses and capital improvements by indicating, “The
purpose of these depreciation charges is to have the exact cost

As a side note, in a compromise to get the Hepburn Amendment passed, the
explicit ability of the ICC to value railroad assets directly was not given; however, it was not expressly forbidden either, a point of contention for years. For a review of the political environment surrounding the development of the ICC and
the 1906 Hepburn Amendment, see Miranti [1989].
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of a particular month or a particular year, and thus enable a
correct statement of net revenue from operations.” The article
then explained that the new definitions of betterments and additions will also result in keeping the cost improvements out of
current operating expenses.
The lack of depreciation of track and way structures had
been noted just a week before in the Journal [May 29, 1907,
p. 6], anticipating the new accounting rules. The article quoted
an ICC official who said, “operating expenses must not be burdened with expenditures for additional equipment, tracks, ballast, or additions to the railroad, the purposes of which are to
improve the property operated.” In addition, the official further
divulged: “The chief new feature of these primary accounts is
that a depreciation account, set aside for renewal accounts, has
been supplied for every item of equipment. [However] there is
no depreciation account for way and structures.” The article
then quoted Adams as saying, “it is impossible to arrive at any
final conclusion as to how the rule of depreciation should be
applied to roadbed and buildings, and that the subject will be
specifically investigated during the coming fiscal year.” Adams’
trepidation over any change of betterment accounting rules for
track and way structures would continue in ICC policy making
for years to come due to the ICC’s indecision about just how
to depreciate permanent structures given conflicting theories of
wear and tear and cost matching. The issues would be a focus
of railroad depreciation debates lasting into the early 1980s.
THE REACTION TO THE ACCOUNTING CHANGES
Reactions by Industry through the Railroad Press: As expected,
protests over the new accounting rules were almost immediate but surprisingly cordial. One of the first was an innocuous
attempt by L.F. Loree, president of the Delaware and Hudson
RR, to circulate a petition asking the ICC to postpone the implementation of the accounting rules for one year. He made the
request, “on the grounds that it will make it impossible for railroads to make comparisons in the results of their operations
for the previous year” [the Gazette, 1907, p. 869]. In an era of
pen and ink accounting systems, a better request would have
been for a delay in the implementation of the new rules due
to the short period, approximately four weeks, given the railroads to comply with the new regulations. For the ICC, they
felt the transition, which was scheduled for the post-June 1907
reporting period, actually gave the railroads one year to implePublished by eGrove, 2006
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ment the new accounting system before the June 1908 reports.
Any delay at this point would have pushed its implementation
back to 1909.
A Times article [June 15, 1907, p.12] provided a better preview of the coming opposition from the railroad industry, reporting that, “efforts are being made by some large railroads
to thwart some of the plans of the [ICC] in the matter of stand
ardizing the accounts of all railroads, and for the establishment
of such form of accounts as will set forth clearly all financial
operations.” Rail industry leaders had supposedly gathered to
discuss the matter and cooperate on a response. As an interesting side note, both the newspaper and the industry must
have misunderstood the new ICC regulations due to an erroneous impression that tracks and roadway were included in the
depreciation order. In a surprising revelation, the article pointed out that the other railroad officials put the blame for the
ICC’s new rules on the Pennsylvania Railroad’s decision to use
depreciation accounting, an interesting comment considering
the Pennsy’s later protests.The rail officials felt that Pennsy’s
move gave the ICC the final impetus to modify its stance on
the emerging depreciation issue. Finally, the rail industry also
saw that the new rules were probably rooted in politics, with
President Roosevelt pushing for the changes. The writer of the
article, however, felt the new accounting rules, “set the true [financial] position of railroads, and enable investors … to determine more easily just what each railroad is doing in the matter of maintaining property and the extent earnings are used
to improve it.” The writer’s last argument may have again signaled the ICC’s hidden safety agenda.
In an attempt to define the industry’s objections to the new
accounting rules, the Gazette began publishing a series of specif
ic articles about the rules. In an article with the combative title
“A Defective Accounting System” [the Gazette, June 21, 1907, pp.
883-884], the industry put forth its early arguments against the
new system. The three-page technical article (its tone though
was that of an editorial) began with an explanation of the proc
ess used to develop the new rules including the participation
by the AARAO, an issue that would spilt railroad officials later. First, the article criticized the way the ICC used the account
ant’s recommendations, which “serves to illustrate how easy it
is for railroad regulation to go astray and make mistakes unless the persons doing the regulating possess the broadest kind
of outlook of the entire situation.” Next, the industry saw the
ICC as a threat due in part to its politicized nature and its lack
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of direct experience in rail operations. Finally, the editorial explained that there were only two purposes for keeping accounts.
The first purpose was to prevent unauthorized expenditures and
the second was to control operations. Essentially, the industry
felt that the new rules applied quite well to the first, but failed
in their attempt to meet the second purpose for four primary
reasons.
First, the railroads rejected the new system based on the
structure of accounts because they feared that the new account
scheme would commingle labor and material costs for both
track and equipment betterments. Next, they went on to point
out that the new account system, “interrupts the continuity of
rail statistics at a time when statistical details are most needed
to point the way to necessary economies and to test the efficiency of operating methods.” This continuity issue would continue
for some time to come. The roads were also against a monthly reporting of depreciation because they felt that such costs
could not be efficiently apportioned on a regular basis because
of the irregular pattern of wear and tear. This issue might have
been mitigated by a compromise to use units-of-usage (probably based on ton-miles) methodology to determine the depreciation charge. This would have allowed railroads that had operational disruptions due to weather or seasonal business history
to deal with equal apportionment problems. Finally, the article
explained that the new rules would handicap rail operations
and analysis because they would not be able to keep accounts
and data not specifically approved by the ICC. This may have
referred to operational measures (e.g., cost per ton-mile) that
the railroads did not want the ICC to see because this may have
lent support to their depreciation theories.
A Journal report [August 20, 1908, p. 5] articulated a similar continuity argument when it said that, “railroads are finding a great deal of trouble in compiling their annual reports
to conform with all the requirements. … Unless they issue two
reports, one after the plan followed in the previous years, and
one under the new accounting system, it will be very difficult
for the humble stockholder to get an idea of what the company has been doing by comparison with last year.” In this same
article, a comptroller at a “large New York railroad” was quoted as saying, “it is useless to make any comparison of figures
under the new rules with those in the old way … you are bound
in the end to get results that are misleading. … We spent a lot
of money and put in a lot of night work, but when the results
were ready, they were not worth a picayune.”
Published by eGrove, 2006

15

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 33 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 15
104

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2006

The problems related to the continuity of rail statistics were
also explained to railroad stockholders in annual reports. For
example, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad (Exhibit 2 below)
in its fiscal year 1908 annual report discussed these accounting
changes in a tenor that shows its displeasure with the regulations.
EXHIBIT 2
Note on ICC Accounting Change as
Presented in the 1908 L&N Annual Report
Uniform Accounting System Prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission:
On July 1, 1907, the new system of Accounts prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission became effective. Principle changes caused by the orders of
the Commission were:
1. Elimination of Expenditures for Additions and Betterments from Operating Expenses, and,
2. The inauguration of formal Replacement Accounts for Depreciation and
Renewals of Equipment.
The changes wrought by the new system should be borne in mind when
making comparisons of tables in this year’s reports with those in reports of previous years.
[Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 1908, p.13]

In a follow-up editorial to “A Defective Accounting System”
[the Gazette, September 27, 1907, p. 86], the editor pointed out
that the “errors in the new system are on the whole more hurtful than those in the old, and we believe it to be a matter of the
greatest regret that at the time a change is made … a change,
moreover, which works permanent injury to the continuity of
records.” In an historical irony, when betterment accounting
was finally discontinued by the ICC in 1983, the FASB had to
issue a standard (SFAS 73) to deal with continuity of reporting
problems.
Another problem raised by this article centered on a perceived uneven application of the rules. For example, the article noted that a northeastern railroad that is no longer growing
would have a smaller amount of depreciation charges due to a
lower rate of equipment additions. Intuitively this would lead
to less expense, higher income, and a correspondingly higher
rate of return on assets. A higher return would, of course, lead
to a reduction in tariff rates. By comparison, the expanded depreciation charges of a railroad in California that continues to
grow due to migration would have a lower rate of return and,
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thus, get rate relief from the ICC. Such perceived inconsistencies in rate setting, however, had been a regulatory problem at
the ICC since its inception in 1887. The infamous “long haul
vs. short haul” clauses in the original Interstate Commerce Act
that essentially equalized, under the theory of price discrimination, all railroad operations in the country regardless of operational efficiencies. The depreciation charges only exacerbated the problem.
Theoretical Arguments: The Gazette [October 11, 1907, p. 90]
published “Equipment Depreciation and Renewal,” written by
the controller of the Union Pacific, William Mahl. In the article, Mahl seemed to imply that there is no depreciation if the
railroad is constantly upgrading or replacing its equipment.
Making a distinction between physical and economic depreciation, he ends the article by pleading to drop the depreciation
requirements in favor of the old “provision for ‘renewals’ to
represent the current cost of replacing all equipment vacated.”
Mahl point out that, “This change will furnish the Commission
with reliable data about the depreciation which has been carried into the operating expenses of the railroads will enable it
to order adjustments suitable to each case if any such should
be necessary.”
Even with the protests, Adams and the ICC issued more
accounting regulations in January 1908. These focused on the
specific information that the ICC required from railroads every six months, starting in March 1908. The new regulations,
however, did not change track and way structure accounting
nor did they provide guidance on the actual rates a railroad
should use to depreciate its equipment. The one clarification
to the 1907 rules noted that the equipment was to be reported on the balance sheet net of depreciation and that the asset
book value was to be “reduced periodically to the extent of the
depreciation charge.” Under the original 1907 regulations, the
railroads assumed that the depreciation was a current operating expense, but not necessarily a reduction of book value on
the asset. This new regulation unsettled the railroads because
of its impact on the return-on-assets ratio and the public’s perception of railroad over-capitalization due to a depreciation of
equipment that is faster than the payment of bonds.
The Gazette [January 16, 1908, p. 54] reported on this
new set of regulations and others to come. In general, the article  discussed the process by which the ICC modified its rules
and some related changes to income statement and balance
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sheet rules. In an attempt to portray the ICC as an inflexible
and bureaucratic organization, the Gazette reported that, “An
erroneous impression has been created that the [ICC] is disposed to reconsider the propriety of depreciation on equipment
accounts. … In working out the details of such an account the
commission is willing to consider all practical suggestions and
is working with members.” The views of Professor Adams were
unaltered on this subject.
To combat the new regulations, Frederick Delano, the president of Wabash Railroad, wrote his “Notes on the Application
of a Depreciation Charge in Railway Accounting,” which was
published by the Gazette [March 1908, pp. 471-473]. In this article, he criticized the ICC’s depreciation rules on rolling stock
and then warned that the regulators would soon be issuing new
accounting rules regarding fixed structures. Delano wanted to
make his opinion clear to the ICC that depreciation does not
exist in an economic sense, but is solely related to wear and
tear and obsolescence. He wrote: “There is admittedly a depreciation or deterioration … but it is difficult drawing the line between the cost of making good this sort of depreciation and ordinary maintenance.” Further to the point, he observed that, “in
the case of cars depreciation goes on at a rate of 5 percent or 6
percent per year until the car is 60 per cent depreciated of its
original value. Beyond that it is assumed there is no depreciation if maintenance is properly kept up.” This type of deterioration was a concept he called “limited depreciation” because
the property is eventually replaced through the betterment system at which time the costs would be absorbed into current
expenses. He relates these facts to a perceived public controversy regarding the arcane problems of railroad overcapitalization. Essentially, in a long diatribe, Delano felt that the capitalization of American railroads was solid, and used this fact as
evidence of the efficacy of betterment charges. Delano also felt
that the current system was more flexible than the new depreciation system, allowing better decision making by the board of
directors regarding the integrity of the property. This can only
mean that railroad management wanted to retain the right to
decide when and if betterments and replacement occurred.
Delano then criticized the ICC requirements for depreciation as fictitious by explaining: “To put expenditures into
operating accounts that have not been actually made has been
regarded as ‘padding’ accounts. To make a charge of depreciation every month on a purely arbitrary basis, when the money which is charged is not actually spent in replacement is
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 bviously charging against operating expenses something for
o
which no expenditures has been made.”10
It is clear from Delano’s objections that the railroad industry was resisting any rapid change in its accounting methods from largely cash basis to one that necessitates extensive
accruals for matching current expenses with income. In addition, it is also clear from Delano’s comments that industry suspected the ICC’s new rules did have an ulterior safety motive
after he pointed out that the public and stockholders had the
right to know the condition of a railroad’s property. Delano
ended his article by concurring with “A Defective Accounting
System” that the change in accounting would be unevenly applied and mature railroads like Delano’s Wabash would suffer
the most. To counteract the problem, Delano felt that any depreciation charge must be offset by a corresponding adjustment
in the appreciating value of the property. This would have been
even more onerous to the industry because the ICC rate setters
would have probably recognized such appreciation as income
and lowered tariffs correspondingly.
Railway Age [May 1, 1908, p. 623] synthesized the arguments of both Mahl and Delano and indicated that the ICC’s
intentions for the new accounting rules were two-fold. The first
was to charge depreciation over and above current repairs to
operating expenses monthly (economic depreciation). Second,
the ICC’s purpose was to charge this “average life of property”
to the profit or loss or surplus account, essentially the modern
matching principle. The article felt that these were neutral issues when taken separately, but that the industry objected to
them taken in operating expense money that was not spent. A
monthly charge for accruals would, in the industry’s opinion,
make the system too rigid and inflexible and deprive the railroad of the ability to judge when expenditures should be made.
The argument from the editorial was simple, “since the charge
for depreciation is not met with payment of money, it is not an
expense, and since depreciation continues … even though operations cease, it certainly is not an operating expense.” The concepts of modern accruals and matching had not yet taken hold
in the railroad industry. Since it appeared that the ICC was
not going to relent, the article finally suggested a compromise
10
Delano’s arguments may have come from a 30-year-old court case, United
States vs. Kansas Pacific Railway Company [99 U.S. 455]. In this case, the court
disallowed the railroad from using depreciation to determine the amount of net
earnings available to pay back certain government sponsored bonds.
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where there would be a presentation of two forms of operating accounts, “operating expenses other than depreciation” and
“depreciation.”
H.A. Dunn, a partner at Haskins and Sells, made a similar
argument in a letter to Railway Age [May 29, 1908, p. 726], but
he wanted to name the account “expired outlay on productive
plant” (the basic definition of economic depreciation). According to Previts and Merino [1998, p. 219], the founder of Dunn’s
firm, Elijah Watts Sells, was critical of the ICC’s new accounting
rules. He essentially believed that, “depreciation charges should
be sufficient to ensure asset replacements.” Previts and Merino
then explained that Sells and Price Waterhouse partner Arthur
Loews Dickinson argued this based on the assumption that depreciation recognition was the only way that one could prevent
the erosion of capital, an argument closely allied with railroad
executives.
In an April 20, 1908 letter to Adams, Dickinson [1980, pp.
13-14] wrote: “The object of a depreciation is, we take it, to
make a provision for the decreases in value from year to year
by reason of wear and tear, etc., as it accrues instead of as it
is made good.” Dickinson continued by saying that, “It seems
to us that to such a proposition there is an obvious corollary
that renewal expenditures made to arrest Depreciation should
be charged against a Fund created in the years depreciation
accrues, and not against the operating expenses of the year in
which the expenditures are made.” It is clear that Dickinson
had not moved to the concept of economic depreciation, favoring the 30-year-old accounting methodology articulated by Albert Fink.
The opinions of Sells and Dickinson would soon run contrary to that of the accounting profession in general. For example, Arthur Teele [1908, pp. 89-91], an early supporter of the
ICC’s new depreciation rules, indicated, “that I do not think it
is necessary for me to present arguments … as to the necessity
of promptly taking depreciation of capital … for I believe anyone
who gives careful thought will agree to the principle of providing for the loss out of revenues earned in the period the loss is
occurring.” Teele was on the side of matching and economic depreciation. The next year, William Lybrand [1909, pp. 224-227]
took much the same view of the need for depreciation except
he stressed the balance sheet rather than the income statement
because he felt betterment accounting would result in the assets appearing at cost regardless of deteriorated value, wear and
tear, or replacement.
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Later in that year, Adams used the same themes as Teele
and Lybrand in a speech to the annual meeting of the American Association of Public Accountants on October 23, 1908. Adams [1908, p. 381] explained to the audience, “When carried
to its final analysis, the question of formal depreciation charges to operating expenses is simply a question of what constitutes cost of operation and the time when such cost shall be
acknowledged.” He further told the gathering that the new system assumed “the depletion through the use of that asset in
operations creates an item of cost of operation that should be
reflected in the accounts when the fact of this depletion takes
place.” He further pointed out that, “a statement of net revenue made without including this element of cost in operating
expenses, is an erroneous statement.” Adams finished this section of the speech by saying, “an expense arising through the
consumption of property employed in operations ought to be
acknowledged on the accounts with the same scrupulous fidelity as an expense caused by the consumption of labor or material.”
Adams had obviously solidified his conclusions related to
the matching principle and the conservative timing on the recognition of costs. He summed up his feelings on the subject:
“[It is my] proposition, however, that depreciation is a proper
charge to operating expenses [and] is one which is regarded as
an established principle in the science of accounts.” Because
railroad accountants had helped the ICC create these accounts,
it appears that he meant these comments for the consumption
of his opponents, the railroad executives and some of their public auditors.
An Internal Industry Debate: In a front-page article, the Journal
[May 2, 1908, p. 1] weighed into the depreciation argument,
more or less on the side of the railroads. The article detailed
the “modifications” that railroad officials wanted the ICC to
make to the new accounting rules. Many of these changes dealt
with a reduction in the total number of accounts required by
the ICC. Most of these accounts dealt with equipment reporting detail and the corresponding depreciation for each. The argument was that 90% of all operating costs were contained in
these accounts.
The report further explained that railroad officials had
criticized and chastised the railroad accountants (the AARAO
committee) for insufficiently studying the effect that depreciation would have on the bottom line. The railroad officers also
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complained that net operating revenues were down due to the
new rules, although they omitted to explain that there was a
general economic downturn of the American economy at this
time. In the end, the rail executives seemed to want the account
ants to help them in two contradictory ways. First, the account
ants were to report high net income for stock market purposes,
while at the same time reporting low net income for rate-setting
purposes, an error already pointed out by Adams in his valuation example. Even after a year, the railroad officials were still
having problems with ICC definitions of what economic depreciation actually represented, the matching of cost to revenues.
It became clear that debate over depreciation had moved from
an industry/ICC conflict to an internal rail industry debate.
The controller of the Erie Railroad, M.P. Blauvelt, was
one of those executives who criticized the AARAO in an April
29, 1908 speech. Blauvelt said that the AARAO’s Committee of
Twenty-Five “caved in” and “materially altered” its position on
many aspects of the new accounting system to meet Adams’
demands. The speaker then echoed the rail industry’s party line
regarding the new accounting rules by stating that, “to depreciate is to lessen the value” of the equipment [Railway Age, May
15, 1908, p. 81]. C.F. Calvert [1908, p. 230] disputed Blauvelt’s
accusations by explaining that the “loss in value feared” by the
railroad executive should actually be viewed in much the same
way the ICC saw it, as a part of the cost of production.
After chastising the AARAO, Blauvelt then brought a new
dimension to the anti-depreciation argument when he suggested that the ICC might not have the authority to compel railroads to show properly maintained equipment in a state of
depreciation. This was an early indication that if rhetoric and
public opinion would not change the mind of Professor Adams,
then maybe the courts could. The Commission probably foresaw these future arguments from Blauvelt when it wrote in its
1907 annual report [ICC, 1907b, p. 141] that it interpreted the
Act, “as imposing upon it the duty of protecting the integrity
of the net revenue statements published by carriers, and it believes that formal depreciation charges, conservatively administered, are essential for attainment of this end.”
The Gazette [October, 1908, p. 1,050] presented another compromise by urging the ICC to drop depreciation accounting
and require current replacement cost accounting, which it felt
would be an improvement over betterment accounting. The article focused on the fact that no two railroads were alike, and
that any standardized depreciation rates and accounts were not
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feasible. The article went on to address ten more problems with
the new system. Most of these dealt with procedures and theoretical questions like obsolescence and reserve accounts. However, the most prominent was the ICC’s assumption that depreciation charges would better protect the stockholder by making
the charges more standardized and understandable.
Nearly 15 months before, the Times [August 12, 1907, p.
10] had supported this position when it focused on the impact
the new accounting changes had on the stockholder and the
market. The article went on to say, “the new system would enable both the bondholders, and stockholders of the railroad to
better understand the nature and amount of the company’s income.” By contrast, the issue was raised that the new ICC rules
favored railroad accountants and not line operations people.
The argument behind this complaint was unclear, but seemed
to center on the supposed rigidity of the new rules. As noted
previously in the June Gazette article, the railroads were worried that the new rules would preclude the gathering of additional and  specific “non-financial operating data” used for efficient rail operations. This type of managerial accounting data
may have included studies of wear and tear on locomotives,
not the  corresponding economic depreciation as intended by
the ICC.
Problems with the Application of the New Rules: As the reporting period for June 30, 1908 came and went, it was clear that
the railroads were “suffering” under the new rules. The Journal
[October 13, 1908, p. 1] reported that annual reports of the railroads for the first fiscal year since the adoption of new depreciation rules “. . . may not fully justify the present form of such
rules, but they go towards affirming the necessity for some more
uniform and systematic principles for the treatment of equipment maintenance.” The article went on to point out that the
results of the new accounting rules for fiscal 1908 were marked
by an “enormous divergence as between one road and another.”
The Journal felt that these problems revealed “to what extent
each has in the past been a law unto itself not merely as to
meeting the individual idiosyncrasies of its own service, but also
to the ideas concerning the maintenance of the integrity of capital investment.” These comments seem to correspond with the
ICC’s hidden maintenance agenda that would force the roads
to upgrade equipment. In fact, the Journal articles stressed this
point when it opined that the “popular idea of the new rules has
been that they required all roads to increase their maintenance
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charges to cover a more or less imaginary or at best theoretical depreciation not previously provided for.”
Though its editorial policy had been decidedly against the
new rules, the Journal did say it was surprised to find that some
railroads’ costs actually decreased with the new system as Delano and others had predicted. The real reason for the great diversity of operating results was the fact that each railroad had
a free hand in setting its depreciation rates. The Journal awaited future developments: “It remains to be seen whether the
commission will continue to leave the percentage of depreciation to the individual determination of the carriers, or attempt
to fix the percentages for them.” Yet, the Journal’s assessment
was not totally pessimistic: “Thus far this plan seems to work
well and pretty directly toward the ends the commission set out
to accomplish.”
Were the new rules a failure? From the railroad industry’s
perspective, the answer was an unequivocal yes! The tone of
the Journal seemed oddly contradictory when it implied that
that the ICC’s new rules were failing due to the railroad industry’s intransigence and not because of the concept of depreciation itself. Regardless of the reasons, it was clear that the ICC
had a problem on its hands.
A full year before the Journal’s editorial, a Times article [October 3, 1907. p. 13] reported these potential problems this way:
“As matters stand, each road has been left to decide for itself
what percentage it will charge off for depreciation, but all are
obliged to charge off some percentage. There is no uniformity
in making these charges for depreciation.” This article pointed
out that the Rock Island Lines would use a 4% rate for locomotives while the Gould Lines were more conservative with a
corresponding 2% rate. The only guidance on the subject that
came from the ICC was as an introductory letter from Professor
Adams in the 1907 The Classification of Operating Expenses. In
the section entitled “Consideration of Depreciation,” Adams had
indicated that the depreciation charges should be based on the
value of the equipment with a percentage applied to the original cost. Adams went on to say, “the percentage rate required
for depreciation of equipment should be limited to the rate required to replace the price paid” [ICC, 1907a, pp.10-12]. In the
1908 update [ICC, 1908, p. 22] of the rules, Adams expanded
and modified his comments to include a depreciation calculation net of scrap value, and declared that there should be no
depreciation recognized past the equipment’s estimated useful
life. Again, the ICC failed to give guidance on useful lives and
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rates. Adams, in the report, only indicated that the monthly
charge for depreciation should be computed “using a percentage of original or purchase price.”
Inevitably, the decision that allowed rail companies to select individual depreciation methods rather than mandating
a common methodology created a loophole for operating ex
penses reporting. The Times [October 3, 1907, p. 13] noted that
the larger rail systems were seeing a decrease in earnings because of the new depreciation rules. The article then indicated that the railroad community “in principle approved of the
requirements of the commission … but in their practical application, many have found flaws.” Surprisingly, this article also
mentioned that some U.S. railroads were already depreciating
equipment on the books, but this was far from a uniform practice. The article then closed with a prophecy: “One thing the
Interstate Commerce Commission will be asked to do is to reduce these charges to some uniform basis. Meanwhile some of
the roads, which have adopted a percentage of depreciation,
find their net earnings are reduced at a rate, which is very discomforting to the men in charge of finance.” Although this high
rate of depreciation may have resulted in reduced profits in the
short run, its probable long-term result may be to increase tariff rates by showing the ICC that return on investment was not
reasonable since current income is compared to assets whose
values were reduced by depreciation reserves. The only way to
stabilize this trend for the railroad was, of course, the continued replacement of equipment.
In a companion article, the Times [October 15, 1907, p. 10]
reported that some roads were concerned that the new depreciation rules might result in a double counting of expenses because, according to the article, “the commission ruled that in
addition to the charges for depreciation all charges for renewals must be included in operating expenses.” Again, the railroads misunderstood that a charge for depreciation reduced
book value as the expense was recognized. The article concluded by forecasting that, “unless the commission does change,
some railroads will resort to a reduction in the percentages of
depreciation which they have been charging.” The Times [December 30, 1907, p. 10] noted that, “It is doubted … whether
the Commission will be able to decide on any uniform percentage of depreciation.” In essence, the railroads were required to
choose rates that fit their situations, and the Commission had
put off the temptation of standardizing depreciation rates across
the board. The article finishing by saying, “it is admitted on all
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sides that very great care will have to be exercised on the commission in fixing any precise percentage for depreciation charges in order to avoid establishing a standard which would meet
the case of some roads, but either exceed or fall short of the
requirements.”
Revised Reporting Rules: The ICC fought back in January 1908
with the publication of new reporting rules for depreciation,
which included the aforementioned six-month ICC reporting
requirements and a new balance sheet classification showing
equipment at original cost less accumulated depreciation. The
Journal [February 27, 1908, p. 8] reported on this development
indicating that the ICC and Henry Adams had “undertaken an
exhaustive review of the treatment of depreciation charges by
interstate carriers during the six months ending December 31,
1907.” The new reporting rules were, in and of themselves, exhaustive and included “blanks” for listing all equipment and
providing separate valuations and depreciation rates, as well
as the impact per month on income and expenses. The Journal’s article went on to observe that this was a technical issue,
and it took familiarity with the railroad accounting to “appreciate fully the labor involved in answering such a series of questions.” These new rules were not merely clerical in nature because they also included onerous regulations that required the
chief railroad accounting officer to certify the accounting and
depreciation results.11 Finally, the article went on to relate that
a great many railroad companies had determined their depreciation charges, “making an intelligent guess at the average life
of locomotives … charging them accordingly.” The writer added
sympathetically: “It will be no small undertaking to apportion
these charges as minutely as the Commission’s desires.”
The problems over depreciation rates would continue for
many years as indicated in the ICC’s 1913 annual report where
it was noted [p. 39] that depreciation rates for similar equipment varied from 7% per year to zero. The report said that the
rates were due to differences in “policy” and were unrelated to
“physical depreciation.” Although the ICC report provided no
standard for depreciation rates, it did give an example that indicated a 1% charge rate would be unacceptably low as assets
11
In a similar fashion to the Hepburn Amendment, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, Section 302, Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports, required that
executives of all publicly held corporations had to sign an affidavit regarding the
accounting procedures used in the financial statements.
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would be overstated and a fictitious surplus created. The example then indicated that a 7% rate was probably too high, leading to an understatement of income and the creation of “secret reserves.” The “manipulation” of depreciation rates was of
concern to the ICC; it planned to rein in these problem reporters. The Commission made it clear to its readers that it had
the power to do so under law, but the tactics of the railroads
themselves were about to change. Since rhetoric and protest had
failed to dislodge the new accounting rules, it was evident that
the tide of power had turned against these once politically powerful railway concerns. They were left with only one recourse
– challenge the new accounting rules directly, first through civil disobedience and then, if necessary, the courts.
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE DEPRECIATION RULES
The rail industry, in a brief but combative article in the
Times [March 2, 1908, p. 10], continued to protest the high
cost of the application of the new depreciation rules. The article noted that there had been plenty of grumbling from railroad officers because the ICC had compelled them to include
monthly depreciation charges in operating expenses. It was reported that the politically powerful Pennsylvania Railroad had
gone so far as to refuse to comply with the order. Naturally, the
ICC wished to fortify its position with complete knowledge of
past and present accounting practices.
The Gazette [January 31, 1908, p. 681] confirmed the
Pennsy’s stance on this issue and that of the New York Central
as well. The publication indicated that the railroads, in making
monthly earnings reports to the ICC, declined to sign an ICC
affidavit to that effect. In response, the government proceeded
against these roads for non-compliance by sending a ten-day
notice compelling the roads to sign the affidavit. Earlier in the
debate, the Journal [October 5, 1907, p. 8] had reported that
there was no uniformity among railroads in their planned actions against the new accounting rules. At this point, it was reported that companies like the Pennsylvania Railroad had not
yet made final decisions to defy the accounting and reporting
orders permanently. The railroads’ indecision over litigation
may have had as much to do with the unknown future effect
that depreciation would have in the future financial outcomes
of the companies as to the authority of the orders themselves
because some roads were actually benefiting from the change.
Regardless of the vacillating opinions of the industry, at
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this late date, any legal recourse appeared limited due to a Supreme Court ruling in January 1909 that supported depreciation charges for determining rates in the public utility industry.12 In City of Knoxville vs. Knoxville Water Company [212 U.S.
1], the Court ruled that “a deduction for depreciation from age
and use must be made from the estimated cost of reproducing
a waterworks plant when determining the present value of the
tangible property for the purpose of testing the reasonableness
of the rates fixed by a municipal ordinance.” This ruling indicated that depreciation was a “determinant of, not an allocation
of net income,” rendering invalid the utility’s argument that depreciation was confiscatory in nature.
The possibilities for legal action began to improve when
the Lehigh Valley Railroad announced in the Times [October
18, 1909, p. 13] that it was refusing to recognize the authority of the Commission. In short, their argument was that the
ICC had the authority to promulgate accounting requirements,
but not to force them on the roads. This protest was directed
against the ICC’s final installment of the uniform accounting
regulations in August 1909. These regulations, according to the
report, “restrict(s) the discretion of the directors in the matter
of charges for depreciation of equipment.”13
These issues reported by the Times may have been only
“shadow problems,” while the real issue centered on the new
form of a balance sheet formulated by the ICC that showed
more detail about capital and asset accounts. The formal protest to the ICC from the Lehigh Railroad indicated that the company believed that the accounting orders “assumed an authority which was not intended to be granted to the commission
by Section 20 for the act … and further believes the adoption of
said orders will not before the best interests of the railroad.”
Essentially the railroad felt that the accounting rules were an
unwarranted appropriation of the company’s surplus.
The railroad also contended that those depreciation charges applied to the cost of betterments (repairs) and not the purchase of additional or replacement equipment. It argued that,
“it is not the desire of the [railroad] to enter at this time into
12
Public utilities included water, gas, and power companies which did not
come under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
13
As a side note, the new rules actually gave the railroads more flexibility
in determining what amounts should be capitalized by allowing labor to be expensed under certain conditions. In addition, the ICC relented and combined the
accounting for betterments and additions. This had the effect of streamlining the
number of accounts required.
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any argument with the commission regarding the merit or lack
of merit of the systems of accounting prescribed in the orders
mentioned above, as the statistician of the commission, we understand has been favored in conference with the views of our
representative.” The ICC had apparently listened to the Lehigh’s
complaints but had either dismissed or ignored them. The article went on to comment that while there were no current plans
for litigation, the railroad was thinking “about testing the validity of the orders in law or equity.” It should be noted here that
the railroad, in its discussion, moved from mentioning Adams’
name to the more pejorative “statistician of the commission.”
The debate was turning personal.
To add another wrinkle to the rail industry’s anti-depreciation stance, the article mentioned, “the system promulgated by
the commission partakes in many respects the practice followed
by the British railroads, the financial condition of which, and
their cost of performing service, not withstanding lower wage
rates paid in that country, being too well known to elaborate
explanation.” Delano also complained about this perceived British bias and the apparent inefficiencies in its transportation system. The “anti-British” focus may have started when Adams, in
a letter to the railroads in 1908, quoted a British accountant as
having said: “No profit can exist until the expired outlay of productive plant has been provided out of gross revenue” [Chapman, 1908, p. 623].
A similar article in the Journal [October 18, 1909, p. 6] a
week later framed much the same argument by claiming that
capitalizing betterments (repairs in the eyes of the railroads) is
an appropriation of income and an increase in asset value on
the balance sheet that the stockholders would improperly perceive as source of new capital rather than a charge to profit
and loss. The 1909 rules apparently changed the focus of the
roads because they were now worried about a public perception of too little expense rather than the 1907 problem of too
many new charges.
The Journal also thought that it would be unwise for American railroads to adopt excessive capitalization that had worked
“so disastrously” for English railroads. W.G. Taylor defined the
term “overcapitalization” as “capitalization (stocks and bonds)
merely in excess of the cost of production or reproduction of
the plant” [Johnson, 1908, p. 325].14 It was thought that in the
14
The British also felt that the Americans were moving to their system. A
sarcastic article regarding the situation was published in the British account-
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absence of a dollar for dollar match in long-term bonds and
fixed assets, it would be assumed that the railroads were gouging the public because of the higher rates needed to cover any
“excess borrowing.” Overcapitalization went against the public good. The more colloquial term for this methodology was
“stock watering,” which had given the railroads a bad reputation in the past. This issue would continue contentious for the
next 20 years and would be the crux of future rate arguments.
It constituted the central reason why the ICC was going to attempt systematically to standardize the “value” of all railroads
in the U.S.
Before any of the railroads could file against the ICC, a
parallel set of lawsuits began working their way through the
courts. The Goodrich Transportation Company and the White
Star Lines attempted to have the 1910 issuance of Special Report Circular 10, which required them to report certain accounting data to the ICC, overturned in court. In ICC vs. Goodrich Transportation Lines and White Star Line [224 U.S. 194],
the two companies argued that they did not come under ICC
jurisdiction because the law creating the ICC implied that only
shipping lines affiliated with railroads could be regulated. As
independent Great Lakes steamship lines, they were therefore
exempt. The Times [April 2, 1912, p. 15] reported that that the
court disagreed and indicated that they were required to follow
ICC regulations because they were a business in the pursuit of
interstate commerce by definition of the law.
Because the courts allowed the ICC to require formal reporting by the water-borne carriers, the railroads’ protests over
accounting and reporting issues appeared to be dead, except for
one challenge from the Kansas City Southern Railroad filed in
November 1911. The Journal [November 17, 1911, p. 1] reported that the railroad sued in Commerce Court over the refusal
of the Commission to allow the capitalization of certain outlays.
The argument was narrow and dealt with a $10 million charge
that the ICC wanted taken into income because the railroad did
not “charge against earnings the estimated replacement value
of six parcels of abandoned roads incident to grade reduction.”
Simply put, it had not offset the cost of new railroad grades
ing journal Accountant on July 20, 1907. It noted: “The ‘reform’ is curiously interesting inasmuch as it affords a rather pathetic spectacle of the United States
striving to get back to the low level of British railroad statistics and Great Britain struggling to attain the fullness of perfection exhibited by the now discarded
American method” [ Journal of Accountancy, 1907, p. 318].
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they had completed with the value of the abandoned right-ofways for depreciation purposes. The railroad felt that this process not only hurt income but also impaired the market value of bonds issued to pay for the betterments. There appeared
to be a contradiction in the ICC regulations because it allowed
capitalization on the grade changes to the existing right-of-way
but not for the change in location of the same rail system that
would have substantially reduced operating costs.
The Supreme Court issued its ruling in Kansas City Southern vs. U.S. [231 U.S. 423], upholding the ICC’s rules [the Journal, December 6, 1913, p. 1]: “The Supreme Court sustained a
ruling of the ICC, and established absolute authority of that
body to decide questions of accounting practice.” Adams, however, could not savor this 1913 victory as he had retired two
years earlier from the ICC after nearly 25 years of service. Although the seven-year debate over accounting policy had started
out cordially enough, by the time of his retirement it was beginning to get ugly with civil disobedience, litigation, and recriminations. A Times editorial [September 24, 1910] eyed the suspicious nature of the ICC as it pertained to the dual issues of
accounting treatments and railroad valuation. The article took
the stance that no two railroads could ever be valued the same,
“Yet, it is the [holy] grail of the Interstate Commerce Commission.”
The critical tone of the editorial seemed to point to the illadvised concept that all railroads were equal and that such regu
lations would harm the industry. Adams was portrayed sarcastically: “In obedience to the theories of Prof. Adams [the ICC] has
adopted a system of accounting designed to impede the methods of betterments from earnings which has made the capitalization of American railroads a world’s marvel.” This was probably another veiled reference to the opinion that English roads
were overcapitalized. Whether the ICC indeed viewed the English system of accounting to be superior is not known, but it
probably saw most other industries embracing economic depreciation and became unrelenting on the issue, wavering little from its basic theory. Such regulations, as the railroads and
the press felt, penalized the efficient and well-run railroad.
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS
By the end of 1913, the ICC had essentially won on the
i ssues of uniform accounting measures and its authority to
impose reporting requirements on the railroads. The ICC’s
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 nnual report [1913, p. 39] noted: “The Commission continues
a
to receive … the cooperation and assistance of different classes
of carriers in formulating accounting systems which will furnish the Commission with the largest possible measure or information while recognizing the practical limitations.” Within
the next year, the ICC would issue a wide range of accounting
regulations for all the constituent industries and companies under its jurisdiction. Round one of the great American deprecia
tion debate was over.
The ICC and the related concepts of “economic depreciation” and “cost matching” were clear winners, but the necessity of maintaining efficient rail operations in a large, prosperous, and growing country would take precedence over theory
for the near future. In an apparent vindication and a mild rebuke to the theories of Henry C. Adams, the ICC granted the
railroads a five percent rate increase on December 18, 1914. Although reported as a victory for the railroads, it was indicated in the Times [December 19, 1914, p. 1] that gross revenues
compared to expenses had dropped drastically since 1910 due to
the “inelastic nature of many expenses.” According to the Commission, the “recent increased provisions for depreciation … that
may militate against a fair comparison of … comparable statistical items … we cannot say this on the record that such charges as the present returned by the carriers are excessive, viewed
with from the standpoint of proper accounting.”
The ICC commissioners, even with the accounting data before them, could not decide upon the reasonableness of rates of
return as envisioned by Adams, but neither did they scrap the
new system in favor of the old pre-1907 betterment accounting
rules. In this case, it appeared that regardless of what the rates
of return were telling the ICC about them, the railroads were
not generating enough income and corresponding cash flow to
cover operations and complete the necessary asset replacements
mandated by the ICC. In fact, the ICC realized that the roads
were in a dire situation because they would be unable to float
bonds in Europe to finance replacements due to the war that
had erupted in August 1914. In the end, even with Professor
Adams’ rate theories and uniform accounting data, the decision
had come down to one of expediency and necessity to maintain
the integrity of the American rail system for the traveling and
shipping public. In the meantime, the accounting policy of the
railroads would remain at odds with those of American industry in general for some time to come.
The depreciation debate was again renewed in 1923 when
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the ICC ordered the depreciation of track right-of-way and way
structures. This order set off another ten years of protests and
litigation that would culminate in the ICC’s canceling the orders in 1933 due to the economic depression. The final phase
of the debate over betterment accounting would recommence in
the mid-1950s with an attempt by Arthur Andersen to reinvigorate an economically moribund rail system through the convergence of railroad accounting practices with industry GAAP.
This time Arthur Andersen challenged the theoretical underpinnings of railroad accounting rules in light of depreciation
standards issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedures
during World War II. The debate created a strange coalition as
Arthur Andersen stood against the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants which sided with the railroads and the
ICC. The final demise of betterment accounting for rail structures would occur in February 1983 when the ICC, bowing to
pressure from the Internal Revenue Service and the Securities
and Exchange Commission, abolished its usage. Congress abolished the ICC itself in December 1995.
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